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targeted by antisubmarine warfare
forces. American naval strategists of this
era can take satisfaction in having correctly postulated that the central purpose
of the entire Soviet navy was to support
the submerged missile forces, particularly the Deltas and their successors near
the Soviet coasts.
The authors dispassionately and authoritatively document the eventual decay of
the Soviet land-based and sea-based strategic nuclear edifice. Perhaps this is why
the FSB has declared the book a work of
espionage. In fact, one of its authors,
Igor Sutyagin, was arrested and held on
charges related to his research for the
book. Yet it is cold comfort even for an
American reader to note the degeneration of the Russian early-warning satellite system or the pollution hazard
caused by the way in which the nuclear
submarine fleet was deactivated.
The table on nuclear testing provides a
keen insight into the mindset of the Soviet decision-making elite, as well as the
efficacy of focused, centralized planning.
The sheer size of the program and its
reckless disregard for the environment
persuasively show the political power of
the Soviet nuclear-industrial complex.
The hundred pages devoted to this program make clear its importance. Of particular note, the Soviets conducted 135
nuclear explosions for industrial or
other “peaceful” purposes. In fact, the
Lazurit explosion of 1974 moved enough
earth to form a dam.
The authors offer no apologies for the
huge building programs or for the Soviet
Union’s unabashed desire to prevail in
the Cold War arms race. While the book
is not overtly political, one senses that
the authors believe the governmental
pronouncements justifying the building
or destruction of each weapon. They
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make numerous allusions to the Soviet
desire to adhere to international agreements, and to American perfidy as forcing
the Soviets to build all of this weaponry.
There is sadness in the discussion of the
demise of the Russian strategic program,
brought about by the dire economic situation facing Russia and the loss of Soviet republics as newly independent
states, and with them the Soviet test
ranges.
Nonetheless, this book should not be
read for its political message. It is a well
referenced storehouse of knowledge on
Soviet strategic systems, useful to researchers and historians alike. Against its
own standards, it is a remarkable
accomplishment.
TOM FEDYSZYN

Naval War College

Lowenthal, Mark M. Intelligence: From Secrets to
Policy. Washington, D.C.: CQ Quarterly, 1999.
264pp. $28.95

Mark Lowenthal’s professed intent in
writing this book was to fulfill the need
for an introductory text for students of
intelligence. He is well qualified to do so,
having devoted more than twenty years
in the executive and legislative branches
of government as an intelligence official
and as an adjunct professor in graduate
programs at Columbia and George
Washington Universities. (He is now the
vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council for Evaluation.) The resulting work is much more than an
introductory textbook; it is a trove of
valuable information and insights ranging from the basic concepts and definitions of intelligence to a thorough
examination of the intelligence process.
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Thus not only is this an excellent textbook on the basics of intelligence and
ideal for a course in Intelligence 101, but
it is also an interesting and informative
examination of intelligence and national security disciplines, one that
would be of interest and value to national security “old-timers.”
This book addresses the fundamental issue of what “intelligence” is and what it
is not, and it offers a detailed examination of the processes involved in the
practice of intelligence—collection disciplines, analysis, counterintelligence, covert action, the role of the policy maker,
oversight and accountability, and the
ethical and moral issues generated by
intelligence practice. Lowenthal provides
an abbreviated but enlightening history
of the development of the U.S. intelligence community, as well as a summary
of significant historical intelligence developments since the creation of the Coordinator of Information and the Office
of Strategic Services during World War
II. There is not only a helpful examination of the structure of the U.S. intelligence community (with the obligatory
wiring diagrams) but also an interesting
description of the relationships between
and among the players in the community, including the important stakeholders in the budgetary process.
Throughout the book, Lowenthal has inserted sidebars containing brief descriptions and vignettes summarizing the
more detailed material in the text; these
add a certain panache to the work. He
also discusses historical examples of intelligence successes and failures, to illustrate the various concepts and insights
he has mentioned. At the end of each
chapter Lowenthal lists “key terms”
unique to the profession, as well as additional readings. He has also included the
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key provisions of the National Security
Act of 1947, Executive Order 12333, and
the Senate resolution that established the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence;
all these are helpful for ready reference.
Lowenthal provides an interesting and
valuable examination of the “syndromes”
that sometimes affect the analyst, resulting in a faulty analysis and product.
Most interesting is the “mirror-imaging”
syndrome, in which the analyst erroneously presumes that other states will act
in the same way as the United States
would—Pearl Harbor is a classic example. Throughout the book, Lowenthal
emphasizes the importance of the role of
the policy maker and the fact that the
purpose of intelligence is to support the
policy makers who run the government.
He also notes the converse responsibility
of policy makers to provide clear and
unambiguous requirements to the intelligence community.
In his chapter on covert action,
Lowenthal characterizes these activities
as “something between the states of
peace and war.” That may not be entirely
accurate, since covert action may consist
entirely of nonforcible measures. Nevertheless, his description of the covertaction process and his examination of
the ethical issues that are raised in connection with it are right on the mark.
However, one would have liked a bit
more discussion on what does not constitute covert action. For example, section
503(e)(2) of the National Security Act of
1947 exempts “traditional military activities” from the definition of covert action, while in the Senate Report on the
1991 Intelligence Authorization Act, the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
went to some length to describe those
activities, including “almost every use of
uniformed military forces . . . whether or
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not the U.S. sponsorship of such activities is apparent or later to be acknowledged publicly.” More along these lines
would perhaps reveal that policy makers
have quite a bit more flexibility in responding to overseas events and that
covert action is not the only option between inaction and the overt use of
force. But this is a mere quibble.
In sum, Lowenthal has written an outstanding primer on intelligence, the intelligence process, and the intelligence
community.
W. H. DALTON

Department of Defense
Associate Deputy General Counsel, Intelligence

Lerner, Mitchell B., The Pueblo Incident: A Spy
Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy.
Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 2002. 320pp.
$34.95

Finally, an author has done a hardhitting analysis of the USS Pueblo incident of January 1968. Mitchell B. Lerner,
an assistant professor of history at Ohio
State University, does not exonerate the
commanding officer of the Pueblo, Commander Lloyd M. Bucher, for giving up
the ship and crew, and the intelligence it
had gathered. However, of all those who
may have been culpable, Commander
Bucher emerges a hero and is no longer
the scapegoat his superiors made him
out to be. Exhaustive research, including
access to new information released from
the Lyndon Johnson White House files,
leads Lerner to place blame evenly on the
shoulders of the Navy chain of command,
the intelligence community, and Johnson’s
foreign policy advisors, due to their misunderstanding and underestimation of
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the North Korean–Soviet Union
relationship.
Lerner asserts that the intelligence collection effort, code-named Operation
CLICKBEETLE, was the idea of the National Security Agency and that it had
been patterned after the efforts of the
Soviet Union’s intelligence-collection
ships (AGIs) off the coast of the United
States. Deciding that the Navy should be
the operational commander for this strategic tasking, the National Security
Agency turned the program over to it.
Converting tired, old, and slow cargo
ships into intelligence collection platforms with insufficient money, inadequate self-defense, little more than fresh
coats of paint, minimal training, and inadequate safeguards for the sensitive intelligence equipment on board, the Navy
mismanaged the effort from the outset.
The maladies that befell the USS Liberty
in 1967 off the coast of Israel were repeated in the preparation and tasking of
Pueblo just seven months later off the
Korean Peninsula.
The USS Pueblo had been tasked to collect
signals intelligence in the Sea of Japan using the “cover” of conducting hydrographic research. The operation had been
deemed to be of minimal risk, based on
the analogy of the Soviet AGIs. Lerner
contends that whenever an AGI violated
territorial waters, the U.S. Navy would
turn it around with an admonishment
and no more. Would not the North Koreans do the same? Herein rested the
Navy’s greatest miscalculation. The Koreans were not the puppets of the Soviet
Union or its foreign policy executors.
Lerner goes to great lengths to take the
reader inside the mind of Kim Il Sung
and his vision of communism and the
greater glory of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea.
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